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Trump Peace Plan: 
A Good Diagnosis but Bad 
Medication
P R Kumaraswamy
Since the time it was unveiled in the White House on January 28, 2020, 
Peace to Prosperity: A Vision to Improve the Lives of the Palestinian and 
Israeli People1 or more commonly known as Trump Plan, is a non-starter. 
As it was being announced, two main protagonists—President Donald 
Trump and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu—were fighting for their 
political survival. The US Senate was deliberating the House Resolution 
to impeach President Trump and moments before the White House 
event, Israel’s Attorney General Avichai Mandelblit formally filed charges 
of corruption against Netanyahu in a court in Jerusalem. However, both 
leaders managed to weather the political storm; if the Senate acquitted 
the US President, the inconclusive March 2, 2020 Knesset elections—the 
third within a year—injected fresh hopes for the Likud leader. However, 
even the little hopes people had about the Plan were firmly buried in the 
pandemic coronavirus and the unfolding worldwide health emergency, 
mounting human casualties and the impending global economic collapse.
Under such a circumstance, is the Trump Plan still relevant? Or what 
portions of the Plan would be useful if and when the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict takes the central stage of the Middle East?
Prof P R Kumaraswamy teaches contemporary Middle East in Jawaharlal Nehru University and 
is an academic member of the Research Council of Centre for Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS).
























The historic Rabin-Arafat-Clinton handshake on the White House 
Lawns on September 13, 1993 gave hopes for an Israeli-Palestinian 
reconciliation and an honourable settlement of the century-old 
conflict. That was not to be. The outbreak of the second Palestinian 
intifada or the Al-Aqsa intifada in September 2000 largely buried 
the peace process. The last meaningful negotiations happened when 
President Bill Clinton brought Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak 
and Palestinian Chairperson Yasser Arafat for the Camp David talks 
in the summer of that year. The cycle of violence, intra-Palestinian 
conflict, and hardening of Israel’s positions diminished the chances 
of a negotiated solution. Moreover, since June 2007, the Palestinians 
were torn between the West Bank controlled by Fatah-led and 
internationally recognised Palestinian National Authority (PNA) and 
the Gaza Strip controlled by Hamas. If these were insufficient, the 
Arab Spring protests, which began in December 2010, added a new 
dimension; the Arab world is more preoccupied with regime survival 
and the territorial integrity of the Westphalian state structure than the 
political rights of the Palestinians and their statelessness. 
These, in turn, meant a lesser American desire for the revival of the 
Israeli-Palestinian negotiations. Then came President Donald Trump. 
Driven by his inward-looking worldview and with limited interest or 
experience in foreign affairs, President Trump was not enthusiastic 
about the peace process. At the same time, he could not ignore the 
growing international concerns over the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. 
The economic component of his Plan was unveiled in Manama on 
June 22, 2019 and the political part in January 2020. The US team led 
by President Trump’s son-in-law Jerad Kushner actively engaged with 
Israeli leaders and officials. Still, it had no corresponding engagements 
with the Palestinians, the party whose welfare and progress the Trump 
Plan sought to champion.
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Though hailed by some as the “Deal of the Century,” the Plan had 
a unique distinction of being rejected by everyone except Prime Minister 
Netanyahu and his supporters in Israel, and the US. Palestinian President 
Mahmoud Abbas called it “Slap of the century”2 While the 22-member 
Arab League observed that the Plan would not lead to Israeli-Palestinian 
peace.3 The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, closely identified with the 
West, expressed its opposition despite being given a prominent place in 
the Plan. If Bahrain, which hosted the economic summit, made friendly 
noises, the Islamic Republic of Iran called it “treason of the century.”4 
Turkey derided it as “absolutely unacceptable,”5 and the European 
Union accused the US of breaking all international norms and principles 
in presenting a blatantly pro-Israeli and anti-Palestinian proposal.6 
In short, the Trump Plan was a non-starter from the very beginning, 
and it trampled all hopes of an honourable political settlement between 
Israel and the Palestinians. Indeed, it was dead on arrival. 
Yet, the Plan is noteworthy for some of the political observations 
which are rare in diplomatic proposals. Indeed, some of its diagnosis is 
accurate, but it was unable to offer a more acceptable offer.
Undiplomatic Bluntness
The Trump Plan recognises that Israel and Palestinians have “suffered 
greatly from their long-standing and seemingly intractable conflict … (and 
despite the passage of time and innumerable efforts) many of the disputed 
issues have remained largely the same.” It admits that the prolonged 
Palestinian aspirations for “self-determination, improvement in their 
standard of living, social betterment, and a respected place in the region, 
as well as among the nations of the world,” have “not been realized.” 
Indirectly admitting the centrality of the Palestine question for peace in 
the Middle East, the Plan declares that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict “has 
kept other Arab countries from normalizing their relations” with Israel. 
But reversing the traditional approach, it observes that the “absence of 
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formal relations between Israel and most Muslim and Arab countries has 
only exacerbated the conflict between Israeli and Palestinians.” Hence, 
it suggests that the normalisation of relations between Israel and the 
Muslim world would further “a just and fair resolution” of the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict.
The Plan observed that since 1946 “close to 700 UN General Assembly 
resolutions and over 100 United Nations Security Council resolutions” 
have been adopted on the Arab-Israeli conflict. Some of them were 
“inconsistent,” and some were “time-bound.” These, including UNSC 
Resolution 242, over which scholars and countries “have differed on their 
meaning and legal effect” were unable to resolve the conflict. Likewise, 
scores of “intelligent and dedicated people have devoted lifetime in search 
of the ‘ultimate deal,’” which “has been elusive.” Taking cognisance of 
the present realities, the Plan observes that while “no plan will give either 
side all of what it wants” it proposes to offer the Palestinians “who do 
not yet have a state, with a path to a dignified life, respect, security and 
economic opportunity” even while safeguarding Israel’s security. 
Two, the Trump Plan offers a “realistic” two-state solution as 
the endgame. The Trump Plan highlights the prolonged absence of a 
Palestinian state and pledges “path to a dignified national life, respect, 
security, and economic opportunity” while ensuring Israel’s security. In 
such a state, the Palestinians will have “all the power to govern themselves 
but not the power to threaten Israel.” The US also rec gnises emphatically 
that the Palestinians “deserve a better f ture.” If satisfactory steps are in 
place, “the United States will support the establishment of a Palestinian 
State.” 
The Trump Plan also recognises the Palestinian refugees “have been 
treated as pawns on the broader Middle East chessboard,” and a “just, 
fair and realistic solution to the Palestinian refugee issue is necessary to 
resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.” The Trump Plan was even blunter 
and did not spare its Arab allies. It flagged that after the liberation of 
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the Emirate in February 1991, Kuwait “began a systematic clearing of 
Palestinians from the country through violence and economic pressures. 
The population of Palestinians in Kuwait dropped from 400,000 before 
the invasion to about 25,000.” Most scholars tend to sidestep this issue, 
which highlights the intra-regional tensions over the Palestine question. 
Brushing aside political correctness and diplomatic niceties, the Plan 
mentions the treatment of Palestinians by Arab countries. Praising 
Jordan for its absorption of the Palestinian refugees, it observes that “in 
Lebanon, Palestinians have been discriminated against and prevented 
from entering the labour market for decades, even those born in Lebanon. 
They are, for the most part, barred from owning property or entering 
desirable occupations, including law, medicine, and engineering. To gain 
employment, Palestinians are required to receive government-issued 
work permits, but remarkably few are ever given to Palestinian refugees.” 
Such candid observations usually are absent in scholarly works, which 
mainly focus on the Israeli treatment and mistreatment of the Palestinian 
refugees.
Three, the failure and collapse of the Oslo process raised doubts 
among the Israelis, Palestinians, and the wider international community 
over the feasibility of the two-state solution. The trust deficit among the 
principals, growing violence, civilian deaths, and hardening of the Israeli 
positions resulted in some even proposing the one-state solution whereby 
the Israelis and Palestinians could live under one democratic political set-
up.7 Though appealing, this is a euphemism for the destruction of the 
State of Israel, and the Jewish homeland project and hence is not viable or 
realistic. Partly due to growing violence and lack of trust, Prime Minister 
Netanyahu has also been moving away from the two-state solution even 
though international consensus favours coexistence. Hence, the Trump 
Plan reiterating the two-state solution is important. 
Four, the Plan devotes considerable attention to the links between 
Jerusalem and the three Abrahamic faiths and goes to great lengths to 
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mention a host of historical events traced to or associated with the city. 
In recent years, there are systematic efforts by some Islamic countries 
to undermine and even deny the Jewish association with Jerusalem. 
Under their diplomatic pressures, the UNESCO adopted resolutions that 
recognised only the Christian and Islamic associations with the city and 
not its Jewish links.8
Likewise, in cognisance of the Islamic importance, the Plan refers 
to Quranic references to Jerusalem, the city being the first Qibla (or 
direction of prayers) and observes that the “Umayyad Caliphate (756-
1031), based in Damascus, offered Jerusalem as an alternative place of 
pilgrimage when Mecca was controlled by a rival caliphate.” It also lists 
at least 32 specific sites that are holy to all the three faiths. Making veiled 
criticism of the situation before the June War when Israel captured the 
old city, the Plan recognises Israel’s track record in “safeguarding the 
religious sites” of East Jerusalem. It proposes that the status quo or Israeli 
control and administration should continue, and all holy sites “should 
remain open and available for peaceful worshippers and tourists of all 
faith.” Regarding prayers on Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif, it observes 
that “people of every faith” must be allowed to pray “in a manner that is 
fully respectful to their religion.” Though the Plan exhibits a pro-Israel 
bias, it recognises and praises Israel’s track-record since 1967. 
Five, the “prosperity” component of the Trump Plan is rather 
interesting as it devotes considerable attention and detail to the economic 
package. In its view, once “the necessary conditions for investment” are 
created, the Palestinian GDP “could double in 10 years, create over 1 
million jobs, reduce unemployment rate below 10 percent, and reduce 
the poverty rate by 50 percent.” It even seeks to transform the Palestinian 
territories into thriving “business-friendly countries like South Korea, 
Singapore, Taiwan, and Japan” and projects the potential regional 
investments to the tune of over US$ 50 billion spread over ten years. 
These goals are rather ambitious and, if achieved, would considerably 
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transform the daily lives of the impoverished Palestinians in the occupied 
territories.
Six, despite ruling out an Israeli withdrawal to the pre-1967 border, 
the Plan recognises that the proposed Palestinian state would encompass 
“territory reasonably comparable in size in the territory of West Bank and 
Gaza pre-1967.” This would be accomplished through a territorial swap, 
first outlined in Clinton Parameters in January 2001.9 Besides parcels 
on the Israel territories adjacent to the Gaza Strip and along the Israeli-
Egyptian border, it identifies the Arab triangle within Israel as a possible 
area for a swap. To support its position, the Plan has a map identifying 
the possible areas of the territorial composition of the Palestinian state 
(Map 1). It is emphatic that there would not be any “forced population 
transfers” of Arabs or Jews. Above all, the territorial division and 
separation between the West Bank and Gaza Strip remained a challenge 
for the Israeli-Palestinian negotiators since the Oslo days. The Trump 
Plan offers an imaginative underground “transportation corridor directly 
connecting the West Bank and the Gaza Strip through a major road, and 
potentially, a modern railway.”
Despite these remarkable features, why does the Trump Plan invoke 
unanimous rejection, condemnation, and disapproval? The answer is 
obvious; it is highly partisan, skewed, controversial, and hence unrealistic.
Wrong Medication
The Plan evolved over a year wit  limited, if any, Arab-Palestinian inputs. 
Its demands on Israel were minimal. While admitting Palestinian stateless 
and prolonged suffering, it is unable or unwilling to recognise the core 
issue of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, namely, occupation. It depicts the 
possible Israeli withdrawal from the occupied Palestinian territories as 
“a significant concession” because, upon these territories, “Israel has 
asserted valid legal and historical claims, and which are part of the ancestral 
homeland of the Jewish people.” This goes against the international 
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consensus since the early 1970s, which recognises the inalienable political 
rights of the Palestinians, including their right to statehood. Both the 
tone and tenor of the Trump Plan is condescending and not respectful of 
the Palestinians and their rights and claims. 
Two, the Plan makes a clear distinction between the PNA-ruled West 
Bank and Hamas-ruled Gaza Strip. Reiterating the traditional American 
position that Hamas is “a terrorist organization,” it holds “Hamas’s terror 
and misrule” responsible for the “massive unemployment, widespread 
poverty, drastic shortage of electricity and potable water, and other 
problems” facing the residents of the Gaza Strip. Hence, the Plan expects 
that the government of an independent Palestinian state “will not include 
any member of Hamas” or any militant groups unless they explicitly 
recognise Israel, abandon terror, and commit to nonviolence and other 
agreements and obligations. 
Three, on some of the core issues of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, 
the Trump Plan moves away from the international norms and 
consensus. It adopts controversial positions that were in line with the 
policies pursued by President Trump since he assumed office in 2017. 
In line with his November 2019 position that Israeli settlements in the 
occupied territories are “illegal,” the Trump Plan observes that Israel 
“will not have to uproot any settlements, and will incorporate the vast 
majority of Israeli settlements into contiguous Israeli territory. Israeli 
enclaves located inside contiguous Palestinian territory will become 
part of the State of Israel and be connected to it through an effective 
transportation system.” It categorically rules out any Israeli withdrawal 
from the occupied Palestinian territories. In its view, “Israel and the 
United States do not believe the State of Israel is legally bound to 
provide the Palestinians with 100 percent of the pre-1967 territory.” 
If this is not sufficient, the Plan further adds that the “Jordan Valley 
(which is part of the West Bank that Israel captured from Jordan in 
the June War of 1967) will be under Israeli sovereignty.” Even though 
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Netanyahu has been making such a suggestion, the Trump Plan gives 
a green signal to Israel for the annexation of the fertile part of the 
West Bank.
Four, while recognising the holiness of Jerusalem “to multiple faiths” 
and the need to keep it “always … open to worshippers of all religions” 
the Plan declared that in line with the December 6, 2017 decision of 
President Trump, “Jerusalem will remain the sovereign capital of the soil 
and it should remain an undivided city.” It further urges the international 
recognition of Jerusalem as Israel’s capital. Firmly rejecting the Palestinian 
claims to the city, the Plan proposes that the Palestinian capital “should 
be in the section of East Jerusalem located in all areas east and north 
of the existing security barrier (that Israel has built, in violation of the 
Geneva Convention on occupied territories) … and could be named Al 
Quds or another name.”
Five, the Palestinian demand for a sovereign state has enjoyed 
wider international support and endorsement. The Plan visualised not 
a territorially-constrained and scattered entity but also with limited 
sovereign powers. Citing security considerations, it suggests that under a 
peace agreement with the Palestinian state, Israel “must have operational 
control over the airspace West of the Jordan River,” that is, over the 
entire West Bank part of the Palestinian state. Likewise, Israel “will retain 
sovereignty over territorial waters” of the Gaza Strip.
Six, the military is one of the visible symbols of sovereignty and 
taking the development logic, it felt that the Palestinians should not be 
burdened with maintaining an independent army. According to the Plan, 
the Palestinian state “will not be burdened with such costs, because it will 
be shouldered by the State of Israel.” The funds that “would otherwise be 
spent on defence can instead be directed towards healthcare, education, 
infrastructure, and other matters to improve Palestinians’ well-being.” 
Once a Peace Agreement is signed, “Israel will maintain overriding 
security responsibility for the State of Palestine.” In other words, when 
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it comes to security issues, the Palestinian state would be nothing more 
than another district of Israel. 
Seven, the Plan challenges and overturns the traditional international 
position on the question of Palestinian refugees. On December 11, 1948, 
the UN General Assembly adopted Resolution 194 that endorsed the 
right of the “refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace 
with their neighbours should be permitted to do so at the earliest possible 
date, and that compensation should be paid for the property of those 
choosing not to return.”10 Though the expression “Palestinian refugees” 
did not appear, from the beginning, the resolution was read, interpreted, 
and anchored as the basis for Palestinian right to return.11 While there were 
disagreements over the number of Palestinian refugees since President 
Harry S. Truman, all American administrations saw it as a reminder of 
the Palestinian refugees. Many American presidents unsuccessfully tried 
to get Israel to accept a significant number of Palestinian refugees within 
the context of family unions. The failure of the Camp David talks in 2000 
was partly due to an unbridgeable gulf between Israeli and Palestinian 
positions regarding refugees.
In an unusual move, the Trump Plan flags the issue of Jews who 
left their homes in Arab countries and emigrated to the newly found 
State of Israel after 1948. Since the 1950s, Israel had suggested that 
there was a de facto population exchange between Arabs who fled 
Mandatory Palestine and Jews who fled Arab countries. This line of 
argument resurfaced during the Osl  accords—both to reduce Israel’s 
role in the refugee problem and to reduce the number of Palestinians it 
would have to absorb within a peace settlement. The Trump Plan adopts 
the Israeli position and observes: “Nearly the same number of Jews and 
Arabs were displaced by the Arab/Israeli conflict.” While Israel absorbed 
Jewish refugees from Arab countries, the Palestinian refugees “who were 
displaced have, in very significant numbers, been isolated and kept from 
living as citizens in the many Arab countries of the region.” In its view, the 
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issue of Palestinian refugees could not be resolved without considering 
the Jewish refugees, “including compensation for lost assets, must also 
be addressed. Additionally, the State of Israel deserves compensation for 
the costs of absorbing Jewish refugees from those countries. A just, fair 
and realistic solution for the issues relating to Jewish refugees must be 
implemented through an appropriate international mechanism separate 
from the Israel-Palestinian Peace Agreement.”
It means that Israel will not absorb Palestinian refugees; Jews refugees 
also need to be compensated; and any financial package would be an 
international arrangement. According to Trump Plan, “There shall be 
no right of return by, or absorption of, any Palestinian refugee into the 
State of Israel.” By absolving Israel of any role in resolving the problem, 
the Trump Administration once again went against international law and 
consensus on the refugee question. 
The refugee problem has another dimension. Towards mitigating 
their problem, an agency—United Nations Relief and Works Agency 
(UNRWA)—was established in December 1949 to deal with the refugees 
of the 1948 Arab-Israeli War exclusively. This meant that the Palestinian 
refugees are not the mandate of the other refugee agency, namely, United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees established in December 
1950. From the beginning, a large portion of the funds for the UNRWA 
has come from the US. As the Trump Plan admits, between 1950 and 
2017, Washington contributed about US$ 6.15 bill n to UNRWA, and 
in the last decade, it “contributed US$ 2.99 billion (US$ 3.16 billion 
in 2017 terms), which accounted for 28 percent of all contributions to 
UNRWA.” For quite some time, the UNRWA has been criticised for its 
role in “perpetuating” and not resolving the problem.12 Accusing the 
agency of being “irredeemably flawed,” on September 1, 2018, the US 
ended its funding to the UNRWA.13 
Israel would not absorb the Palestinian refugees, and the US 
would not fund the UNRWA to offer even minimal sustenance to 
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the refugee population. Then, how to solve the Palestinian refugee 
problem? According to the Trump Plan the solution lies in the 
Jordanian model. After the 1948 War, when the Hashemite Kingdom 
annexed the West Bank, it granted full citizenship to all the Palestinian 
refugees and residents of the area. Likewise, the Trump Plan wants 
the host countries to absorb the Palestinian refugees residing in their 
territories, and this is more valid for Lebanon and Syria, which have a 
large Palestinian refugee population. As of January 1, 2019, there were 
475,075 registered refugees in Lebanon,14 while Syria had 552,000 
registered refugees living in nine camps.15 
However, a vast majority of the Palestinian refugees are scattered 
in different parts of the Middle East and beyond, and the Trump Plan 
offers a three-pronged solution for their resettlement; their absorption 
by the future Palestinian state; possible absorption by host countries; and 
members of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation accepting 5,000 
refugees each year, for up to ten years (50,000 total refugees) subject to 
their consent. For its part, the US would work “with other countries to 
establish a framework for the implementation” of the resettlement plan. 
Far from seeking a “just and lasting” solution to the refugee problem as 
visualised by UNSC Resolution 242 in November 1967, the Trump Plan 
transfers the responsibility to others and categorically asks the Palestinians 
to give up their right to return to their homes. 
Eight, the Plan limits Palestinian sovereign functions in the realm of 
foreign relations. According to the Tr mp Plan, the future Palestinian 
state “will not have the right to forge military, intelligence or security 
agreements with any state or organization that adversely affects the 
State of Israel’s security, as determined by the State of Israel.” It further 
demands that the Palestinian state “will not be able to develop military or 
paramilitary capabilities inside or outside of the State of Palestine.” While 
the Palestinian state “will be able to establish diplomatic relations with 
other countries,” its admission into international organisations would 
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be subject to the Israeli veto. In its view, the Palestinian state “may not 
join any international organization if such membership would contradict 
commitments of the State of Palestine to demilitarization and cessation 
of political and judicial warfare against the State of Israel.” This is partly 
in response to several UN and other international organisations accepting 
the State of Palestine as a member. Palestine became a full member of 
the International Olympic Committee (1995); International Federation 
of Association Football, FIFA (1998); UNESCO (2011); and Interpol 
(2017); and its applications in several other bodies such as World Health 
Organisation (WHO) and World Trade Organisation (WTO) are pending. 
Since Palestinian membership often results in these international bodies 
adopting positions and resolutions highly critical of Israel, the Plan sought 
to prevent such possibilities by preventing Palestinian membership in 
international bodies. 
Nine, since the 1950s, the US has been active in limiting and even 
ending the Arab economic boycott of Israel.16 The early 1990s witnessed 
considerable dilution of the secondary and tertiary Arab boycott. Still, 
the demise of the Oslo process led to new grass-roots-based activism 
against Israel in the form of Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) 
movement.17 Based primarily in European Union countries, it seeks to 
end all economic, political, and academic contacts and engagements with 
Israel and its citizens. 
The growing reach of the BDS movement has resulted in Israel 
increasing its countermeasures through domestic legislations and political 
campaigns in the US and other countries. The Trump Plan joined the 
anti-BDS campaign and observed that the Palestinian state “should 
cease to support anti-Israel initiatives at the United Nations and in 
other multilateral bodies … should not lend their support to any efforts 
intended to delegitimize the State of Israel.” The US views “the BDS 
movement as destructive towards peace, and will oppose any activity that 
advances BDS or other restrictive trade practices targeting Israel,” and 
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demands that the Palestinian state should oppose the BDS movement 
“and any other effort to boycott” Israel. 
Ten, the most positive aspect of the Trump Plan is its economic 
component. It proposes a slew of infrastructure projects, developmental 
activities, and investments to the tune of over US$ 50 billion. But the 
mute question is, who would fund it? The Arab world is struggling 
with the economic cost of the Arab Spring amidst falling oil prices, the 
prime source of revenue for the wealthy Gulf Arab countries. Despite 
their stated goals, countries like Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Kuwait have 
been struggling to move away from their oil-dependent economy. In 
proposing a grand economic framework, the Trump Administration is not 
prepared to shoulder the financial burden. Both during the campaign and 
since assuming office, President Trump has been riding on the popular 
American revulsion against overseas financial investments and demanding 
friends and allies to do more. The approach of the Trump Administration 
on a host of issues such as military engagements (Afghanistan, Iraq, and 
Syria), economic commitments to the EU, and tax regimes vis-à-vis 
China underscore the principle of burden-sharing. Hence, despite not 
consulting allies and other players while it was being prepared, the Trump 
Plan’s economic agenda rests on international financial contribution and 
participation. Given their overall reservations, Arab or European countries 
are unlikely to contribute financially to make the Trump Plan work.
The bleak future of the President’s Plan was bef re the onset of the 
Coronavirus. While the problem began in late 2019, its reach outside 
China was felt from mid-January, around the time the Trump Plan was 
unveiled. As Thomas L. Friedman put it brilliantly, Our new historical 
divide: BC and AC—the World Before Corona and the World After.18 
With growing infections and deaths, the virus is setting the international 
agenda, confining millions inside their homes, amid wrecked economies, 
institutions, and livelihood. As the world is passing through its toughest 
socio-economic crisis, it is safe to assume that the already unpopular 
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Trump Plan would be quietly buried among the scores of unsuccessful 
peace initiatives. 
India’s Reaction 
Some of the positives of the Trump Plan are in sync with India’s traditional 
position, but the proposed solution is not. Reminding that New Delhi has 
been “consistently supportive of the Palestine cause,” the spokesperson of 
the Ministry of External Affairs called for “a two-state solution” achieved 
“through direct negotiations between the two parties and be acceptable 
to both.” It urged both parties to “engage with each other” to consider 
the Trump Plan in finding “an acceptable two-State solution for peaceful 
coexistence.”19 The statement came in response to a media query and was 
made just weeks before India hosted President Trump. 
The Trump Plan did not reflect India’s approach to the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict, nor does it further India’s interests in the Middle 
East. India could not be enthusiastic about it. At the same time, it is 
evident to seasoned observers that the Plan has no chance of making 
even minimal impact on the region, and any negative response from 
India would only generate unnecessary and avoidable reactions from the 
Trump Administration.
The Trump Plan makes a clinical assessment of the critical problems 
of the Middle East and underlines the prolonged statelessness of the 
Palestinians as the core problem. But the remedy it proposes is not only 
unrealistic but also insulting to the Palestinians and seeks to legitimise 
the status quo. It considered, addressed, and accommodated a section of 
the Israeli right-wing represented by Prime Minister Netanyahu. Hence, 
it invoked only little support in the Middle East and beyond. Even little 
hopes were silently buried on March 11, 2020, when after considerable 
hesitation, the WHO declared the Coronavirus as a global pandemic. The 
Trump Plan is yet another example of a missed opportunity. 
P R KUMARASWAMY
























1. The White House, “Peace to Prosperity: A Vision to Improve the Lives of the Palestinian 
and Israeli People” (The White House, January 28, 2020).
2. Agencies, “‘Slap of the Century’: Palestinians Slam Trump Middle East Plan,” Al-Jazeera, 
January 28, 2020. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/01/century-palestinians-
slam-trump-middle-east-plan-200128185131612.html
3. Agencies, “Arab League Rejects Trump’s Middle East Plan,” Al-Jazeera, February 1, 2020. 
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/02/arab-league-holds-emergency-meeting-
trump-plan-200201105251740.html
4. Staff and Agencies, “Iran, Turkey Slam Trump Peace Plan as UAE, Saudi Arabia Urge 
Negotiations,” The Times of Israel, January 29, 2020. https://www.timesofisrael.com/
iran-turkey-slam-trump-peace-plan-as-uae-saudi-arabia-urge-negotiations/
5. AFP and Staff, “Erdogan Says Trump’s Mideast Peace Plan ‘Absolutely Unacceptable,’” 
The Times of Israel, January 29, 2020. https://www.timesofisrael.com/erdogan-says-
trumps-mideast-peace-plan-absolutely-unacceptable/
6. “EU Rejects Trump Middle East Peace Plan, Annexation,” Reuters, February 4, 2020. 
https://in.reuters.com/article/israel-palestinians-eu/eu-rejects-trump-middle-east-
peace-plan-annexation-idINKBN1ZY1QM
7. Abdel Monem Said Aly, “The Case for the One-State Solution,” The Cairo Review of 
Global Affairs, no. 32 (2019). https://www.thecairoreview.com/essays/the-case-for-the-
one-state-solution/; Ghada Karmi, “The One-State Solution: An Alternative Vision for 
Israeli-Palestinian Peace,” Journal of Palestine Studies 40, no. 2 (Winter 2011): 62-76, 
https://doi.org/10.1525/jps.2011.XL.2.62; Uri Savir, “Are Palestinians Contemplating 
One-State Solution?” Al-Monitor, April 8, 2018. http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/
originals/2018/04/israel-palestinians-mahmoud-abbas-demography-two-state.html
8. “UNESCO Resolutions Concerning Jewish Historic Linkage to Jerusalem,” 
Contemporary Review of the Middle East 4, no. 2 (June 2017): 211-23. https://doi.
org/10.1177/2347798917695114
9. “The Clinton Parameters,” Economic Cooperation Foundation, Tel Aviv, December 23, 
2000. https://content.ecf.org.il/files/M00162_TheClintonParameters-EnglishText_0.
pdf
10. UN General Assembly, “UNGA Resolution 194,” UN, December 11, 1948.
11. ICG, “Palestinian Refugees and the Politics of Peacemaking,” Middle East Report (Brussels: 
ICG, 2004).
12. For a critical assessment of the UNRWA see the Fall 2012 issue of Middle East Quarterly. 
https://www.meforum.org/meq/issues/201209
13. “US Ends Aid to Palestinian Refugee Agency,” BBC News, September 1, 2018, sec. US & 
Canada. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-45377336
14. UNRWA, “Where we work, Lebanon?” https://www.unrwa.org/where-we-work/
lebanon 
TRUMP PEACE PLAN: A GOOD DIAGNOSIS BUT BAD MEDICATION























15. UNRWA “Where we work, Syria,” https://www.unrwa.org/where-we-work/syria 
16. Martin A. Weiss, “Arab League Boycott of Israel,” CRS Report (Washington, D.C.: CRS 
Report for Congress, June 10, 2015).
17. Ellen Cannon, “The BDS and Anti-BDS Campaigns,” Jewish Political Studies Review 30, 
no. 1-2 (2019): 5-64.
18. Thomas L. Friedman, “Opinion | Our New Historical Divide: BC and AC—the World 
Before Corona and the World After,” The New York Times, March 17, 2020, sec. Opinion. 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/17/opinion/coronavirus-trends.html
19.  India, MEA, “Official Spokesperson’s Response to a Question on Israel-Palestinian Issue,” 
January 29, 2020. https://mea.gov.in/response-to-queries.htm?dtl/32335/Official_
Spokespersons_response_to_a_question_on_IsraelPalestinian_issue
P R KUMARASWAMY
